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In the St1pre111e Court of the 
State of Utah 
RONALD RALPH OLSEN by his 
Guardian Ad Litem, Ralph E. Olsen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SHELDON T. W ARWOOD, BOARD 
OF EDUCATION OF THE AL~PINE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, a Body Corpo-
rate; CLIFTON R. CLARK, CLAR-
ENCE D. ASHTON, VICTOR C. AN-
DERSON, THOMAS PO·WERS, and 
THOMAS A. B-ARRATT, Members of 
the Board of Education of the Alpine 
School District, a Body Corporate, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE 
NO. 7789 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendants to 
recover a judgment against the defendants because of per~ 
sonal injuries sustained by the plaintiff being run over by 
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a school bus owned by the Board of Education of the Al-
pine School District and operated by the defendant, Shel-
don T. Warwood. The injury occurred on February 17, 
1949, at about 12:30 p.m. about four miles north of Provo, 
Utah County, Utah, as or just after the plaintiff alighted 
from a school bus belonging to the defendant school dis-
trict. 
There is no conflict in the evidence as to the existence 
of the following facts: 
At the time involved in this litigation the Board of 
Education of the Alpine School District owned and oper-
ated a school bus which was used to trans.port school pupils 
to and from school (Tr. 128) ; On February 17th, 1949, just · 
after 12:00 o'clock noon, the defendant Sheldon T. War-
wood, who was employed to operate one of the school buses 
of the defendant Board of Education, pursuant to his duty 
called at the Page or Edgemont School and there took on 
a bus load of six-year-old school children, among whom was 
the plaintiff in this action (Tr. 58, 83, 138). 
The defendant, Sheldon T. Warwood, stopped the bus 
near the Edgemont Church for the purpose of permitting 
some of the children, including the plaintiff, to get off the 
bus. Immediately after the plaintiff alighted from the bus 
he was run over by the rear dual wheels of the bus and sus-
tained ~very serious injuries which left him in the hospital 
for 19 days and confined him in bed until the later part 
of May, or more than three months (Tr. 111). The na· 
ture and extent of the injury sustained by the plaintiff was 
describec1 in detail by one of the attending doctors. A num· 
ber. of X-rays ·were taken of the injuries which were re-
ceived in evidence (Tr. 7 to 21). 
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There is a conflict in the evidence as to the exact lo-
cation and condition of the place where the plaintiff was 
injured, and also as to the facts and circumstances that ex-
isted immediately before he was injured. 
Plaintiff called as witnesses two of the children who 
were on the bus and who claimed that they saw how the 
plaintiff was injured. One of such witnesses was the plain-
tiff and the other was Marjorie Ferguson, both of whom 
were six years old at the time in question and both of whom 
were examined by the court as to their competency to tes-
tify. The examinations made by the court as to compe-
tency of the plaintiff to testify will be found in Tr. 53-57,. 
The examination of the court as to the ·competency of the 
\vitn~ss, Marjorie FergtlSon to testify will be found in Tr. 
77 to 81. To enable this Court to pass upon what plaintiff 
claims was prejudicial error in giving .certain instructions to 
the jury, it will be necessary for the Court to have in mind 
the evidence touching the manner in which it is claimed by 
the parties that the injury to the plaintiff was brought about. 
The plaintiff, in substance, testified: 
That on February 17, 1949, about five minutes after 
12 oclock noon, the defendant picked up the plaintiff and 
other children to take them home. That the bus arrived 
at the Edgemont Church about 12:30; that Mr. Warwood 
was in the front of the bus on the left hand side driving the 
bus (Tr. 58); that at the time plaintiff got out of the bus 
there were three or four children on the bus, including the 
plaintiff (Tr. 59) ; that before the plaintiff went to get off 
he was sitting on the bus right behind the driver; that l\1ar-
jorie Ferguson was sitting on the right hand side near the 
front (Tr. 60); that the day he was hurt the bus stopped 
iq front of the Edgemont Church; that there was sno\v on 
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the ground; that when Mr. Warwood stopped the bus at 
the church he said, "Hurry and get out, I have got some 
more kids to pick up today." That when the bus stopped 
Lewis got out and then Shirley got out, and then I went 
to get out. While I was getting a good footing he took off 
(Tr. 61). But he had only one foot out when he took off. 
and "I spun around and flew under the bus, and then I 
tried to get out from under it." 
Q. "Well how did you try to get out from under it?" 
A. "Dig my heels in the ice and push myself out." 
Q. "Then what happened as you were pushing your-
self to get out from under the bus?" 
A. "The wheels passed over me." 
Q. "Which wheels?" 
A. ''The -dual wheels on the back." 
That. Mr Warwood picked him up and put him in the . 
bus af~er he was run over (Tr. 62). That when he got 
home Warwood carried him in the house and when he took 
him in the house his mother was there and Mr. Warwood 
stated to his mother that the child had been hit by. tl:te bus 
and ''I told you kids to stay away from the bus," and mother 
said, in substance, "Well, I don't think that it is necessary . 
to discuss that right now, I think the important thing is 
to contact his father and get an appointment with the doc-
tor. (Tr. 64 and 74). · On cross-examination he testified that 
at the time he was injured he was not running towards the 
bus and trying to catch hold of the side of it (Tr. 75). 
Marjorie Ferguson was called as a witness by the plain-
tiff, and testified in part as follows: That she remembers · 
the day that plaintiff was hurt; that Mr. Warwood stopped 
in front of the Edgemont Church to let plaintiff out (Tr. 
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85). But \vhen he stopped Mr. Warwood said something 
like this, "Hurry and get off here, I have other loads to get 
or other children to pick up, or something like that, I don't 
remember." That Shirley Cluff got off first, and then Louis 
I vie and then Ronny (plaintiff). That she was sitting by 
the railing at the first seat from the door where you go out; 
that she could see the steps that are used in going out of 
the bus from Where she sat; that she saw Ronny (plain-
tiff) as he was leaving the bus; that he wasn't completely 
off the step when Mr. Warwood started up; that she saw 
him grab for the bus, I guess brace himself to pull his other 
leg out, but the bus started up and such a jolt I guess he 
didn't quite have time and the bus run over him (Tr. 86). 
That she saw him lying on the ground after the bus run 
over him (Tr. 87); that when she saw Ronny (plaintiff) 
fall she said, "Oh, there is Ronny"; that she felt a bump 
after the bus started up, "I said what was that?" and Mr. 
Warwood said, "I don't know," and then she poked her 
head out of the window and saw plaintiff lying on the ice 
and snow (Tr. 88). Marjorie Ferguson was recalled and 
testified that on the day that the plaintiff was injured the 
snow where the bus stopped was higher than me, and that 
the snow bank was a little bit farther than the length of 
her arm from the bus door (Tr. 102). The plaintiff was 
also recalled and testified that where he got off the bus 
the snow was about 30 inches high (Tr. 104) and that the 
snow bank was about the length of his arm from the bus 
(Tr. 105). 
Ralph E. Olsen, the guardian ad litem of the plaintiff~ 
testified that he went to the place where the plaintiff was 
injured on the night of the day that he was injured. That 
the snow had been pushed back from the highway and \vas 
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so high that you couldn't stand and jump over it in lots 
of places (Tr. 24). That there was a raise of a foot or ten 
inches; that the snow was a good two feet deep in front 
of the Leo Hansen. property (Tr. 27). That in front of the 
church the snow was about 15 inches high built up against 
the fence (Tr. 28). 
The defendant, Sheldon T. Warwood, testified in part 
as follows: That on February 17th, 1949, a little after 12 
o'clock, he picked up some children at the Edgemont school, 
among them the plaintiff. That he stopped at Stubbs Lane 
where he·let Ronald and the other two, the boy and the gir~, 
out, that the snow at the Stubbs Lane had been pushed 
back so the people could go up that road (Tr. 138). That 
he told the children to get clear of the bus; that· he opened 
the door for the children to get out and they were stand-
ing a good .. five feet away from the bus when he closed the 
door to start up again; that as he turned to go out on the 
highway he looked through the side. view mirror to ·see if 
there was any oncoming traffic. When he did so he could 
see somebody laying on the ground; at that time I thought 
they was fighting, when kids start fighting we try to stop 
them. .That there was the boy and girl standing there by 
him; that he stopped the bus and went to where the plain-
tiff was laying and picked him up and carried him to · the 
bus and took him home; that when he picked plaintiff up, 
he said the bus ran over him (Tr. 140). Mr. Warwood de-
nied that he reprimanded the plaintiff, as testified to by 
his mother (Tr. 179). 
The evidence further shows that the bus that was be-
ing driven by the defendant Warwood at the time plaintiff 
was injured was 29 feet 5 inches long. It was painted yel-
low; it is a full 7 feet:10 inches wide, the sides are 18 inches 
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and the lower step used in going in and out of the bus is 
12 inches from the ground (Tr. 155). A number of photo-
graphs \Vhich defendant Warwood claims to have taken of 
the place \'ihere the accident occurred on Feb. 20, after the 
accident \Vere offered and received in evidence, as were also 
a number of pictures of the bus that was being used at the 
time the plaintiff was injured. 
Shirley Cluff, a witness, called by the defendant, tes-
tified in part as follows: 
Q. "Do you recall the day that Ronny Olsen was hurt 
by the bus?" 
A. "I know that he was hurt, but I can't remember, 
hardly." 
Q. "vVhat can you remember about it?" 
A. "I can remember the winter that the bus stopped 
by the church and I was way up there after he got run 
over." (Tr. 187). 
Over objection of counsel for the plaintiff, counsel for 
the defendant was permitted to ask these questions on the 
claim that he ~as seeking to refresh her recollection (Tr. 
189). 
Q. "No\v I want you to listen right close because what 
I am going to do right now is ask you as near as I -can what 
I asked you then when you were home with your mother, 
and then I am going to repeat the answers that were taken 
down, as -near as I can. Do you remember whether or not 
I asked you this? 'Shirley"-speaking to you that time, 'you 
didn't see him before the bus ran over him?' Now I am 
talking about Ronny. Now did you see him before the bus 
ran over him?'" (vVitness shakes head). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
Q.. "Your answer is no to that?" (Witness nods head)~ 
Q. "And then your answer to that, you said no, and 
then do you remember me asking you this question here: 
'Was he holding onto the bus or trying to get hold of the 
bus?' and then you answered 'No, he was running towards 
it.' Do you remember telling me that he was running to-
wards the bus just before the accident happened?" 
A.. "A huh uh." 
Q. "And do you rmember me asking you again-run-
ning towards the bus?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "And then I asked you this question, 'Do you know 
where he was running towards it?' and your answer 'No, 
he used to just hold it to slide and just slide along with it.' 
Do you remember telling me that? that he used to just hold 
it and slide?" 
A. "Uh huh." 
Q. "Your answer is yes to that?" (Witness nods head)., 
MR. HANSEN: May it please Your Honor, I don't 
know whether she really understands me here or not." 
Q. "Hiad you seen Ronny hold _onto the bus before 
and slide along with it Wh~n it started out?" 
A.. "I don't know whether he did, but there were some 
other kids done that" (Tr. 190). 
On cross-examination, she testified that she did not 
see Ronny hanging onto the back of the bus the day he was 
hurt; that when she got off the bus she walked to the front 
of the bus. and that she didn't go back to where Ronny w~s 
hurt '(Tr. 192). 
We, of course, are mindful that it is not the province 
of this Court in this case to pass upon the weight that should 
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be given the evidence, and we have cited the foregoing tes-
timony for the purpose of directing the attention of the 
Court to the testimony ( vie\ved most favorably to the de-
fendant) upon which the trial court gave certain instruc-
tions to the jury which \Ve contend \Vere erroneous and pre-
judicial to the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment appeal~ 
from and the order refusing to grant plaintiff a new trial 
upon the following grounds: 
POINT ONE 
THIE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST NUM-
BERED 1 (R. 72 and 199) AND IN GIVING IN LIEU 
THEREOF INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 4 AND 5 (R. 90 and 91). 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THAT 
PART OF INSTRUCTION NUMBERED 7 WHEREIN 
THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED THAT ''IN. OTHER 
WORDS, YOU CANNOT RETURN A VERDier IN FA-
\ 
VOR OF TilE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THIE D·E-
FENDANT UNLESS THE NUMBER OF J·URORS RE-
QUIRED TO RE.A.CH A VERDI·CT AGREE UPON THE 
SAME ACT OR UPO·N THE SAME F AlLURE O·R FAIL,. 
URES TO ACT." (R. 201-202 and 225). 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING TO TBE 
JURY THAT PART OF INSTRUCTION NUMBERED 9 
WHEREIN THE JURY WAS INSTRfUCfED THAT ''IF, 
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THEREFORE YOU FIND FR:OM THE EVIDENCE THAT 
AFTER THE PLAINTIFF RONALD OLSEN AND THE 
OTHER CHIIJDREN HAD BEEN DISCHARGED FROM 
SAID VEHICLE AND THAT THEREAFTER WHEN 
SAID VE'HICLE STARTED IN MOTION RONALD OL-
SEN RAN TOWARDS THE SIDE OF THE BUS NEAR 
THE RIGHT WHEEL AT A TIME AND IN A PLACE 
WHERE DEFENDANT CQULD NOT SEE HIM-" (R. 
202-204 and 224). 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIA:L COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS IN-
STRUCfi6N NUMBERED 11 (R 204 and 226). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
Plaintiff requested the trial court to include in its in-
structions to the jury the following: 
"You are instructed, members of the jury, that 
it was the duty of the defendant to exercise a high de-
gree of care to enable the plaintiff to alight and get 
from the bus in safety. The degree of care required is 
such as a very prudent, careful and competent person 
would exercise under similar circumstances.. A fail-
ure to exercise such care constitutes negligence". (R. 
72). 
In lieu of the requested instruction the court instruc-
ted the jury that the defendant was required to use such 
care as a reasonable and prudent person would use under 
like conditions and circumstances (Instruction No. 9, R. 
94-95). 
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There is some conflict in the authorities as to the de-
gree of care that is required of the driver of a school bus. 
Some of the cases hold that the driver of a school bus is a 
private carrier and as such is required to use only ordinary 
care. Such is the holding of the District Court of Appeals 
of California. Shannon et al v. C;entral Gaither Union 
School District, 23 Pac. (2d) 769. Foster v. Elmer, 158 
Pac. (2d) 978. So far as we are able to ascertain, the, ques-
tion has not been decided by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia .. 
On the other hand, it is held by the Supreme Court of 
Washington in the case of Phillips v. Hlardgrove et al, 161 
Wash. 121; 296 Pac. 559, that upon grounds of public policy. 
and in conformity with principles of law applicable to com-
mon carriers and to operators of elevators that the oper-
ator of a school bus is required to exercise the highest de-
gree of care. In the Washington case just cited, the court 
quotes at some length from other cases from Washington 
and from t~e Supreme Court of the United States wherein 
it is held that a common carrier of passengers is held to 
the highest degree of care consistent with the practical op-
eration of the means of transportation being used. 
Some of the cases dealing with the question of the de-
gree of care required of the driver of a school bus seem to 
take a somewhat middle ground. For example, in the case 
of Burnett v. Allen, 114 Fla. 489; 154 So. 515, it is said that 
the driver of a school bus is required "to use every reason-
able precaution and care for the safety of such children 
as to prevent any harm or danger to them." While such 
language is not the same as that sanctioned by the authori-
ties in instructing a jury as to the degree of care required 
of a common~ carrier, the effect thereof is substantially the 
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same. It is, of course., the general rule that greater care 
is required where children of tender years are involved 
than in the case of adults. 
It will be noted that in the instructions given in this 
case, the court merely instructed the jury that they could, 
among other matters, take into consideration the age of 
the children. Such instruction, however, did not enlighten 
the jury as to what, if any, additional care the driver of the 
bus was required to take because the children he was trans-
porting were only six years of age 
The law is well settled that a common carrier of pas .. 
sengers is required to use a high degree of care for the 
.safety of its passengers. The degree of care has been vari-
ously expressed as ''a high degree of care,'' ''the highest 
degree of care, prudence and foresight-the greatest possible 
care and diligence," "the utmost care and diligence," "ex .. 
traordinary care and caution." See 13 C. J. S. Sec. 678, 
pp, 1255-56, and cases there cited. 
This Court is committed to such doctrine. Taylor v. 
Bamberger Electric R. Co., 62 Utah 552; 220 Pac. 695. 
Christensen v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 35 Utah 137; 99 
Pac. 676. The same doctrine is thus stated in 10 Am. Jur., 
.page 163, Sec. 1245: 
"In general, however, carriers of passengers are 
required to exercise the highest degree of care, vigi-
lance and precaution for the safety of those it under-
takes to transport, and is liable for the slightest n~g­
ligence~'' 
Numerous cases which support the text are collected 
in foot notes to the text above quoted. The same degree 
of care required of common. carriers is required of the op-
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erators of elevators. 13 C. J. S., page 1270, Sec. 687, and 
cases there cited. It is there said: 
"While the owner of .a passenger elevator operated 
in a building for carrying persons up and down may 
not be a carrier of passengers in the sense that he is 
bound to serve the public, yet his duty as to protecting 
the pasengers in his elevator from danger is the same 
as that applicable to common carriers of passengers 
by other means, and he is bound to do all. that human 
care, negligence and foresight can reasonably suggest 
under the circumstances and in view of the character 
of the mode of conveyance adopted, to guard against 
accident and injuries resulting therefrom and a failure 
in this respect will constitute negligence rendering him 
liable." See also 13 C. J. S., page 1386, Sec. 734. 
We have a statute 1943, 75-7-24, which provides that: 
''The minimum uniform educational program to 
be provided in the various districts of the state shall-·_ 
include a school term of nine months; the employment 
of legally certified teachers; the transportation to and 
from school of all pupils living .more than two and one·-
half miles from school, or provision towards such trans-
portation of an amount equal to the allowance there-· 
after made for_ the apportionment of the equalization-
fund.'' 
-Provision is made in U. C. A., 1943, 75-7-27, for pay-
ment out of taxes the expenses of transporting children to 
and from school. 
While we do not contend and in our objections to the 
refusal of the court to give the requested instruction touch-
ing the degree of care required of the driver of a school 
bus, we did not claim that the operator of a school bus is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
a common carrier within the meaning of our Public Utilities 
Act (U. C. A., 1943, 76-4-25). We do most earnestly con-
tend that every reason that has prompted the courts tore-
quire common carriers to exercise a very high degree of 
car in transporting passengers is applicable to the driver of 
a school bus that is engaged in carrying children six years 
of age to and from school. 
The fact that a school bus is not a common carrier cer-
tainly does not justify the conclusion reached by some 
courts that it is a private carrier. The principal distinction 
between a comon carrier and a private carrier is that the 
former holds himself out as being willing to carry all who 
apply, while a private carrier is one who does not SQ; hold 
himself out, but undertakes to render service pursuant to 
a special contract between the carrier and the person desir-
ing the service. Generally the degree of care required of the 
two is not the same, although some authorities require the 
highest degree of care and skill for the safety of a passen-
ger from a private carrier. Mahony v. ~ansas City R. Co., 
254 S. W. 16; 286 Mo. 601; 228 S. W. 821. 
The primary basis for distinguishing between the de-
gree of care required of a common carrier and a private 
carrier seems to be that the former having held himself 
out as being able and willing to render service to all who 
apply, by such holding out, the law, on grounds of public po-
Ucy requires such carrier to use the highest degree of care. 
The person who seeks the services of a public or common 
carrier may rely upon the fact that being a common or pub-
lic carrier he has a right to demand the highest degree: of 
care without the ne·cessity of either making an investigation 
to ascertain whether or not such a carrier is competent or 
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entering into a contract that such carrier will use the high-
est degree of care. 
On the other hand, one who employs a private carrier 
has it \Vithin his po\ver and it is his responsibility to em- · 
ploy \Vhomsoever he may choose and to enter into a eon- . 
tract requiring the degree of ·care required of a common 
carrier or requiring the private carrier to insure safe trans-
portation or requiring the carrier merely to use ordinary 
care. A child who is required by law to attend school, who 
has no choice as to ho\v or by whom he is to be transported 
to and from school and who is being transported by one· 
\Vho is paid with money received from taxation is in no 
sense a private carrier. On the contrary, every reason that 
can be advanced to support the doctrine that a common 
carrier of passengers should be and is held to the highest 
degree of care applies to the operator of a school bus. In-
deed, the reasons that might be advanced for requiring tl1.e 
highest degree of care of the driver of a school bus. are 
stronger and more in harmony with public policy than those -
which require such degree of care on behalf of a ·common 
carrier. A six-year-old school child has no ·choice as to the· 
one who is his transporter to and from school. He or his 
parents is indirectly compelled to pay for such service 
Whether he uses it or not. No such requirement is exacted 
on· behalf of a common carrier. 
The driver of a schood bus under the laws of Utah, 
while not compelled to transport all persons who present 
themselves, is by law required to transport all children who· 
fall within the class designated by the law. Unlike a pri-
vate carrier, he cannot carry only those children he chooses 
to carry. Nor may the Board of Education lawfully trans- , 
port some children and refuse to ·transport other children· 
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similarly situated. A school board must treat all children 
similarly situated alike. While a school bus is not a com-
mon carrier, it is certainly a public, as distinguished from 
a private carrier, and every principle of public policy that 
requires the ·exercise of the highest degree of care by a 
common carrier applies to the operator of a school bus. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THAT 
PART O·F INSTRUiCTION NUMBER 7 WHEREIN HE 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT "IN OTHER WORDS, 
Y.OU CANNOT RETURN A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THlE DEFENDANT 
UNLESS THE NUUMBER OF JURORS REQUIRED TO 
REACH A VERDICT AGREE UPON THE SAME Acr 
OR ACTS, OR ·UPON THE SAME F AlLURE TO ACT (Tr. 
92-93). 
The plaintiff objected to the foregoing lnstruction be-
cause it is not the law as applied to the evidence in this 
case (Tr. 207). 
As we understand the foregoing· Instruction, it means 
that if three of the jurors found that the defendant was 
negligent because he did not give the plaintiff sufficient 
time to get off the bus before starting the same and two 
found that the defendant was negligent because. the de-
fendant stopped the bus. too near the f~nce and snow in 
front of the church and the other four jurors found that 
neither starting of the bus or the stopping it before the 
snow piled up at the church was sufficient to bring about 
the· injury complained of but it required the operation of 
the two· acts to cause· the injury to the plaintiff, then and 
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under such a state of facts a verdict must be rendered for · 
he defendant. \Ve confess that \Ve have never heard of 
such an instruction having been approved· and in our some-
\Vhat limited search we have not been able to find an au-
thority so holding. 
We have found cases such as Sportman vs. Wabash R .. 
Co., 177 S. W. 703, 191 Mo. App. 463, where it is held that 
where there are two acts of negligence charged, one of 
which renders the defendant liable and the other does. not, 
the jury must find in favor of the plaintiff on the negli-
gence properly chargeable against the defendant to sustain 
a verdict. We also find that in such cases as Sessions vs. 
Pacific Improvement Co., et al, 206 Pac. 653, and Merrill 
vs. Kohlberg, 155 Pac. 824, that where two counts are al-
leged a general verdict is suffi,cient to support a judgment. 
We can readily understand where two entirely distinct and 
independent acts of negligence are relied upon there may be 
some basis for a jury being required to find as to each act 
and that if they are unable to agree upon which of the, in-
dependent a:c1s caused the injury complained of, a verdict 
for the plaintiff would be improper. In this case and in · 
many cases negligence resulting in injury is c_aused by a 
combination of several acts. Under the Instruction now 
being discussed, the jury could not, as we understand the 
Instruction, find for the plaintiff unless the required num-
ber of jurors were in agreement as to the act or various 
acts which caused the injury. 
A discussion touching the necessity of a majority of 
the judges of an appellate court to agree upon the grounds 
for the reversal or affirmance of a judgment will be found 
in 5 C. J. S. 1314 et seq., 4 C. J. 1121, and cases there cited. 
We can understand that where a case is reversed and a new 
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trial ordered in an action at law, it may be necessary to 
have a majority of the court agree upon the particular er-
ror that is the basis for a reversal as otherwise· the trial 
court will probably be compelled to repeat the error. To 
illustrate, if three members of the five members of an ap-
pellate court say that the trial court correctly gave Instruc-
tion No. 1 and three members say that the trial court cor-
rectly gave Instruction No. 2 and three members say that 
the trial court correctly gave Instruction No. 3, but two 
members say that. the trial court was in error as to each 
of such Instructions it is easy to understand why the judg-
ment should be affirmed even though all five members 
should be of the opinion that the judgment should be re-
versed for different reasons. However, even in such case 
some of the authorities hold that the judgment should be 
reversed. (See eases 'Cited in footnote to the text above 
cited). The case of Wilcox vs. Wunderlich, 73 Utah 1; 272 
Pac. 207, lends support that if a majority of an appellate 
court holds that a trial court was in error in the trial the 
cause should be reversed even though the members of such 
appellate court are not in agreement as to the grounds that 
required a reversal. 
By an·alogy, if a majority of a jury are agreed that a 
defendant was negligent and that his negligence was the 
proximate cause of the injury, we can conceive of no sound 
reasOn why the jury may not properly find a verdict for the 
plaintiff even though they may not be agreed upon th~ par-
ticular act of negligence of which the defendant was guilty. 
POINT THREE 
THlE -TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS IN-
STRUCTION .. NUMBER NINE, WHEREIN THE JURY 
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WERE INSTRUCTED THAT "IF THEREFORE Y·01U 
FIND FROM THE EVIDENCE THAT AFTER THE 
PLAINTIFF, RONALD OLSEN AND THE OTHER CH[L-
DREN HAD BEEN DISCHARGED FROM SAID VE-
HICLE AND THAT THEREAFTER WHEN SAID, VE-
HICLE STARTED IN MOTION RONALD O·LSEN RAN 
TOWARD THE ·SIDE OF THE BUS NEAR THE RIGHT 
vVHEELS AT A. TI~IE AND IN A PLA·CE WHERE DE-
FENDANT COULD N·OT SEE illl\I THEN YOUR VER-
DICT l\IUST BE IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND 
AGAINST THE· PLAINTIFF (Tr. 93-94). 
The plaintiff objected to the foregoing Instruction and 
particularly to that portion thereof wherein the court 
informed the jury that if they found that Ronald Olsen 
ran to\vards the side of the bus near the right wheels and 
if defendant did not expect such p.ction on the part of plain-
tiff, it's because there is no · evidence or pleading which -
sho\vs that plaintiff ran towards the bus (Tr. 202 to 203). 
The law seems to be well settled that, "The scope of 
an Instruction in a particular case, whether civil or ·crimi-
nal, is to be determined not alone by the pleadings therein, 
but also by the evidence in support of the issues; and even 
though an issue is raised by the pleadings, it is not proper 
to give an Instruction thereon ·where there is no basis for 
it in the evidence. An Instruction not based on the evidence 
is erroneous in that it introduces before the jury facts not 
presented thereby, and is well calculated to induce them 
to ·suppose that such state of facts in the opinion of the· 
court is possible under the evidenc~ and may be considered 
by them." (53 Am. Jur., Sec. 579, Pages 455-456). Nu~ 
merous cases from the Federal and State Courts are cited 
in footnotes 17 and 18 to the text above cited .. · The cases 
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of Griffin vs. Prudential Ins. C'o., 102 Utah 563; 133 Pac. 
(2d) 333; 144 A. L. R. 1402; Smith vs. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 
106 Pac. 603, from this jurisdiction are there cited. 
Among the numerous other Utah cases where the same 
doctrine is announced are: Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 
366; 270 Pac. 349; Manti City Savings Bank v. Peterson, 33 
Utah 209; 93 Pac. 566; Ohlinkamp v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 
24 Utah 232; 67 Pac. 411; Hillyard v. Bair, 47 Utah 561; 155 
Pac. 449; Smith v. Cannady, 45 Utah 521; 147 Pac. 210; 
Armstrong v. Larsen, 55 Utah 347; 186 Pac. 97; Davis v. 
Midvale City 56 Utah 1; 18~ Pac. 74; Tyng v. Consolidated-
Lorraine Inv. Co., 37 Utah 304; 108 Pac. 1109; Dimmick v . 
. Utah Fuel Co. 49 Utah 430; 164 Pae. 872; Sagers v. Inter-
national Smelting Co., 50 ·Utah 423; 168 Pac. 105; Cand .. 
land v. Mellen, 46 Utah 519; 151 Pac. 341; \nerdi v. Helper 
State Bank, 57 Utah 502; 196 Pac. 225; Kendall v. Ford-
ham, 79 Utah 256; 9 Pac. (2d) 183. 
Heretofore in our statement of the ease, we have di-
rected the attention of the Court to the testimony of the 
witness, Shirley Cluff, who was called by the defendant. It 
will be noted that under the pretext of refreshing her mem-
ory, counsel for the defendant asked her a number of lead-
ing questions, among which was: 
Q. ''Now I want you to listen right close because what 
I am going to do right now is to ask you, as near as I ·can, 
what I asked you then when you were home with your 
mother, and then I am going to repeat the answers that 
were taken down, as near as I can. Do you remember 
whether or not I asked you this-'Shirley' speaking to you 
that time-'You didn't see him before the bus ran over 
him?" Now I am talking about Ronny. Now did you see 
him before the bus ran over him?' " (Witness shakes head). 
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Q. "Your ans,ver is no to that? (Witness nods head) 
and then your answer to that, you say 'No' and then do you 
remember me asking you this question here? 'Was he hold-
ing onto the bus or trying to get hold of the bus?' And 
your ans\ver 'No, he \vas running towards it.' Do you re-
member telling me that he was running toward the bus just 
before the accident happened?" 
A. "'Huh uh." 
Q. "And do you remember me asking again: 'Running 
to\vards the bus?' '' 
A. "'Yes." 
Q. "And then I asked you this question: 'Do you know 
where he \vas running towards it?' and you answered: 'No, 
he used to just hold it to sl~de and just slide along with it.' 
Do you remember of telling me that-that he used to just 
hold it and slide?" 
A. "Uh huh.'; 
Q. "Your answer is yes to that." 
MR. HANSEN: ''May it please Your Honor, I don't 
know whether she really understands me here or not.'' 
Q. "Had you seen Ronny hold onto the bus before 
and slide along with it when it started out?" 
A. "I don't know whether he did, but there were some 
other kids done that" (Tr. 190). 
There were other questions asked and statements,made 
before the jury such as ''if she were older, I think I .. would 
ask leave to impeach her," (Tr. 191), which were calcu-
lated to impress the jury with the idea that the plaintiff 
may or was running towards the bus just before he was 
injured. It was bad enough to ask such leading questions 
and make such statements before the jury, but such. matter 
may have been overlooked were it not for the fact that the 
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court gave credence to such statements by the giving of 
Instruction numbered 9. 
A careful reading of the evidence of Shirley Cluff will 
show that nothing can be gleaned from the testimony that 
would justify a finding that the plaintiff ·was .running to-
wards the · bus as indicated by Instruction numbered 9. 
There is no other evidence that lends support to such a 
fact. It will be noted from the pictures of the bus that 
there is nothing on the side of the bus that plaintiff could 
hold onto. It is, to say the least, extremely improbable 
that the plaintiff would have run towards the bus, or if 
he should that he eould get there in time to get under the 
rear wheels unless he was attempting to commit suicide. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE·D IN GIVING INSTRUC~ 
TION NUMBERED 11 IN THAT THE SAME IS ARGU-
MENTATIVE AND THlE COURT IN EFFECT COlVI-
MENTED. ON THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
In Instruction numbered 11, the court instructed the 
jury in part that ''In ·weighing the evidence as to defend-
ant's alleged negligence, it is your duty to consider it under 
all of the facts and circumstances existing at the time of 
the accident and not to consider it as you would in looking 
back upon the events from this later date. Quite ordinarily, 
individual actions in any given set of circumstances may 
disclose faults and criticisms when looked back upon and 
tested by cool and deliberate thinking away from the event, 
which would not be apparent to a reasonable and prudent 
person at the time he is surrounded by the circumstances 
of the accident" ( R. 95) . 
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The plaintiff objected to that Instruction for the rea-
son that the same is argumentative in favor of the defend-
ant's claim in this case (Tr. 204). 
The jury is as able to determine the relative value or ef-
fect of looking back on an event as compared with viewing 
the act when it occurred as is the court. It is essentially 
the province of the jury when called upon to decide ques-
tions of facts and the weight that shall be given evidence 
to do so \vithout the aid or suggestions of the court. How-
ley v. Corey, 9 Utah 175; 33 Pac. 695; Smith v. Gilbert, 49 
Utah 510; 164 Pac. 872; l\Ioore v. Utah-Idaho Cent. R. Co., 
?2 Utah 373; 174 Pac. 873. 53 Am. Jur. Page 439, Sec. 
552 and cases there cited in footnotes. 
It is submitted that a new trial should be granted to 
plaintiff, and that he should be awarded his costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. RULON MORGAN 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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